L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public EnterpriseReturn
Results 1 to 2 of 2:
Altruismus a sociální podnikatelství - příspěvek k teorii netržních organizacíAltruism and social entrepreneurship - towards a theory of non-market organizationsPavel ChalupníčekPolitická ekonomie 2008, 56(5):643-655 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.656 Almost all of us sometimes voluntarily give up some scarce resources to make someone else better. Not only the amount of resources used for such purposes, but also other wider concerns (implications for private and government sector) have drawn the attention of economists in recent decades. In this paper I develop a theoretical framework underlying such activities, which can be in short termed as "altruistic". To do so, I first explain the notion of "altruism", as can be found in the works of Adam Smith, Gary Becker and Ludwig von Mises. On these grounds, we can say that by voluntary altruistic transactions the utility of both sides of the transaction has been increased. The main differences between the market and non-market sectors are described and the concept of "social entrepreneurship" is developed. The analysis is concluded by application of this theoretical framework to the case of altruism as a "public good". |
Kontrolní potenciál státu nad zprivatizovanými podnikyControl potential of the state in privatized firmsJan Hanousek, Evžen KočendaPolitická ekonomie 2008, 56(4):467-483 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.648 The privatization strategy in many transition economies involved the creation of a special government agency that administered state property during privatization programs as well as after the privatization was declared complete. The National Property Fund (FNM) was the agency in the Czech Republic. In many firms the state kept residual state property long after the privatization was completed. We analyze the control potential of the state exercised through the FNM via the control rights associated with capital stakes in firms along with special voting rights provided by law. Based on complete data set on assets as well as the means of control in privatized firms we conclude that for most of the 1994-2005 period state control potential was extensive and certainly larger than was found by earlier research. |