G35 - Payout PolicyNávrat zpět
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Známý versus neznámý vlastník: vazby mezi transparentním vlastnictvím a firemním rozhodovánímKnown Versus Anonymous Ownership: Exploring Links Between Ownership Transparency and Firms’ DecisionsJan Hanousek, Jr., Jan HanousekPolitická ekonomie 2020, 68(5):515-533 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1294 The paper extends existing research on the effects of ownership structures on company performance by including a dimension of transparency in the ownership structure. We analyse the effect of an unknown owner and pyramidal structure on company profitability, capital structure and investment. We conduct this research in accordance with existing theories on a panel of private companies within the cultural and political alliance of four Central European countries, called the Visegrad Group. The total population includes over 111,000 firm-level panel data observations between 2001 and 2015. Lack of transparency in the ownership structure leads to lower investment and profitability, both for the case of an anonymous owner and for companies in a corporate pyramid. The capital structure of the company is not influenced by the presence of an anonymous owner; however, the existence of the ownership pyramid leads, ceteris paribus, to a larger debt for the firm. |
Charakteristiky celkových výplat akcionářům soukromých firem v zemích visegradské skupinyFirms’ Total Payout Characteristics in Visegrad CountriesJan Hanousek, Jiří TrešlPolitická ekonomie 2019, 67(5):458-475 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1252 This paper examines payout characteristics of firms in a cultural and political alliance of four Central European nations, the Visegrad Group. The sample consists of more than 100,000 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2015. Our results indicate that smoothing behaviour diminishes among firms with majority ownership and that the total payout characteristics behave according to existing theories on passive ownership behaviour and agency costs. |