F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsNávrat zpět

The article focuses on the motives and trends in gold holdings by central banks in recent decades. It examines the correlation between the nominal and real price of gold and selected macroeconomic variables and financial assets over the financial and business cycles. In this context, it outlines gold investment opportunities for central banks and other investors. The paper also highlights differences in gold holdings between the central banks of advanced economies (including those with reserve currencies) and those of emerging market and developing economies. It concludes by presenting a rationale for the position of the Czech National Bank, which ranks among the modern central banks holding minimal amounts of reserve gold.

The article deals with the two key issues that have been fundamentally changing the European Union - the crisis of Eurozone and the Brexit. The first part discusses the change of the original balance of power in the EU after the exit of Britain and its possible consequences, especially the strengthening of the relative position of France, and hence the French concept of the EU integration model (deeper federalization of the nucleus and the rest) resulting in an even more explicit model of the two-speed EU. In the ideal Pareto model of the Union, paradoxically, the possibility of exit makes the Union more stable and compact. The second part of the text discusses the problem of the uncompetitiveness of Southern Europe as a specific case of Dutch Disease and four scenarios of its solution - the disinflation or deflation of the South, the inflation of the North, the exit from the common currency and finally the transfer union. The last named scenario is the least attractive of given options, but it is already in progress. The imbalances in the Target 2 payment system discussed in the article are example of this. The conclusion of the article brings ten points summarizing necessary economic and political measures for the EU at the time of power shift after the Brexit and ongoing imbalances between the North and the South in the currency union.

The article in the context of the current Greek crisis analyses the consequences of forced unification, occurring in the European Union, at least since the Maastricht Treaty, which is now associated mainly with the process of monetary union. The current stage of European integration is based on political constructivism and it is characterized by the dominance of politics over economy, which in some aspects of the system resembles the communist economy system, which was an extreme distortion of the relationship between politics and economy. The unification model of European integration does not help the weaker European Union countries, for it forces them to use various forms of standardization that brings high (often hidden) costs (exceeding profits). The article notes that the main prize in the economy is the exchange rate. The reason for the imbalances within the monetary union is a non-optimal exchange rate for each member country - too overvalued rate of Greece, but also too undervalued rate of Germany. The text also discusses limitations (systemic and political) and inability to perform adequate internal devaluation and systematic (not just partial, parametric) reforms in Greece. The congenital structural differences among the EU countries and the impossibility of the exchange rate adaptation lead to a systemic Eurozone defect, which results in a fact, that it is not (and, in the present composition, it even cannot be) an optimal currency area.

The paper deals with the monetary policy of the European Central Bank and its effects on economic development of the Czech economy and other new members of EU from the perspective of Post-Keynesian monetary economics. In the first part the basic principles of contemporary Post-Keynesian monetary theory of relative endogeneity of money are shortly presented. The second part concentrates on the Post-Keynesian criticism of the institutional arrangement of the ECB and its monetary policy. The closing part treats issues concerning potential effects of the policy of ECB in the given institutional framework on economic development of the Czech economy and economies of other less developed members of EU after joining the Eurozone. Possible adverse effects on the process of real convergence are discussed and alternative policies eliminating this danger are presented.

Slovak Republic entered the ERM II in the end of 2005 whereby it came nearer to its strategic objective - joining the euro area. In this paper we try to answer two questions. Section 1 examines the features and risks of the EMU. Is EMU an optimum currency area and what is the OCA scorecard of euro area? We conclude that euro area - in spite of its indisputable benefits - is rather a premature monetary union with asymmetric monetary policy effects and other policy asymmetries. Section 2 analyzes possible effects of the EMU on the Slovak economy. We examine the experience of other countries and compare their real convergence to average level of euro area before and after joining the EMU. The readiness of Slovak economy for euro adoption, possible obstacles on this uneasy way and the connection between income level, price level and real convergence are analysed at the end of the paper.

Paper deals with the European Monetary Union from perspective of Post Keynesian school of economic thought. It discusses separately arguments often proposed by mainstream economists. After the brief introduction, which highlights main differences between mainstream and Post Keynesian economic theory, work deals in sequence with trade argument often found in discussion about monetary unification, monetary issues mainly with the role of European Central Bank and lastly, work appraises European Monetary Union from international monetary arrangement perspective proposed by Post Keynesian economists. Based on this evaluation, work concludes stating that Post Keynesian economists are more likely not to be overenthusiastic with European monetary unification.

The article is concerned with analysis of independence of central banks of the EU Member States within the framework of the ESCB, as well as independence and responsibility of the ECB, and suggests an alternative institutional embodiment of its position, reflecting the specific framework of the EMU. The system of selection of members of the ECB's Executive Board blurs a real collective responsibility towards Member States, which opens possibilities for nontransparent lobbyism. Modified system is suggested so that national bank's governors have a symbolic relationship to the political representation, i.e. that they reflect a national economic policy in some way, without being bound and restricted by its formation whatsoever.

The article arrives to the following conclusions. First, the optimal currency area theory cannot deliver critical (objective) values of tests, whose passing would guarantee that costs of adoption of euro would be lower than the benefits. Second, several empirical observations strongly support the hypothesis that early adoption of euro by the Czech Republic would not incur any substantial losses. Third, several recent studies focused on testing the synchronisation of Czech business cycle vis-à-vis Eurozone do apply analytical techniques inappropriately, which implies biased results. Fourth, the Czech economy has enough experience with excessively volatile exchange rate. The greatest advantage of adoption of euro will consist in a replacement of exchange rate fluctuations and substantially higher stability of inflation. In quantitative terms, the weight of accession countries in Eurozone will be too small to influence the overall inflation and thus co-determine the European Central Bank monetary policy.