Politická ekonomie 2021, 69(5):511-528 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1328
Optimal Share of Privatisation in a Public Monopoly with Unionised Workers
- a Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Italy
- b Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Poland
In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the workers' welfare, notably when the union's bargaining power and/or wage-orientation are sufficiently high. This may be counterintuitive because it implies that left-wing governments (with a weak and moderate union) tend to privatise more greatly.
Keywords: Optimal privatisation, unionised monopoly, right-to-manage bargaining
JEL classification: H44, J51, L12, L33
Received: July 21, 2020; Revised: June 8, 2021; Accepted: July 26, 2021; Published: October 22, 2021 Show citation
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