H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed MarketsNávrat zpět

In a monopoly industry with firm-union wage bargaining, we show that it is optimal to privatise a share of the public firm. The optimal privatisation share increases with the union's higher bargaining power and/or wage-orientation and, when the latter is large, full privatisation becomes socially optimal. Interestingly, the optimal privatisation share is the highest (lowest) when the government attributes a medium-low (low and high) weight to the workers' welfare, notably when the union's bargaining power and/or wage-orientation are sufficiently high. This may be counterintuitive because it implies that left-wing governments (with a weak and moderate union) tend to privatise more greatly.

The goal of this paper is to develop the theoretical framework of the public goods provision. This theoretic contribution is based on the critical analysis of mainstream economics theories dealing with public goods as market failure (neoclassical economics and neoliberalism) and on the results of own economic experiment examining the "free-riding" behaviour in the voluntary provision of public goods. The "free rider" problem is one of the main reasons for government intervention in the market. However, there is an inefficiency of public decision making on public provision and financing of selected goods because of the estimating goods values (ex-post consumer utility) problem. Moreover, the results of economic experiments do not support the pure "free rider" theory. However, the economic experiment simulates the real public good consumption that is why this paper contains also the survey of consumers' willingness to pay for specific public goods (public library services) in real terms based on the methodology of contingent valuation method.

The article deals with structural factors affecting decisions about the provision of services in large Slovak cities. In addition to introducing an economic model based on transaction cost theory, models of political decision making regarding the provision of services by cities (ideological model, public choice theory and political risk-aversion model) are described. The article concentrates upon decisions regarding the provision of seven selected services in eight major Slovak cities. In addition to collecting data on the means of providing the selected services, relevant decision makers about the perceived asset specificity and about the measurability of selected services have been interviewed. The findings partly confirm economic hypotheses about the provision of public services, which suggest that oursourcing is expected if the services to be provided are easily measurable. The findings are also consistent with models based on political decision-making, but do not allow to pinpoint any of the political models as the facts are consistent with all three of them.