P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional EconomiesReturn

Teachings of economic policy were present at the VŠE from its inception in 1953 needless to say that most activities were highly influenced by the ruling political climate. Despite all limitations there were some achievements of value, esp. works of prof. Olšovský and his team in 50s and early 60s. Till the economic reform of Ota Šik was real engagement people from the VŠE in economic policy limited (Kurt Rozsypal arrived to the VŠE years after his reform was already enacted). 70s were again years of high political infl uence characterized by creation of Institute of Marxism-Leninism where consisting of all original social science departments. 80s were characterized by the hidden duality of teaching when dominating teachings of political economy of socialism was supplemented by teachings of political economy of capitalism mostly in a guise of history of economic theories. In 90s a full renaissance of economic policy as a subject followed.

The synthesis of cameralism and the classical school of political economy was implemented on university premises in the Czech Lands as the education of Adam Smith was adopted. It was spread out by presentations of Wenzel Gustav Kopetz, the Professor of political economy at the University of Prague, and by professors of political economy at the Olomouc Lyceum (from 1827 at the University of Olomouc). A declining interest of the state in political economy reduced an interest in economic thinking which resulted in a considerable decrease of publishing activity. A certain toleration of authorities to the criticism of the officially prescribed Sonnenfels' textbook has enabled the reception of new ideas of the classical school into the education. The lectures by Professor Kopetz, have been preserved up to these days, can prove it. A new independent part was formed as a discipline of the education.

The study examines the changes of the Central Eastern European region first in the context of world history. It confirms by comparative historical analyses that the transformation was indeed unique. This has been the only total transformation that took place peacefully, without violence, and at the same time astonishingly fast, in the main direction of the economic and the political changes of Western civilization. From that perspective it is an exceptional success story. However, from the perspective of everyday life, the result is different. Deep economic troubles are experienced by a considerable portion of the population. The perception of losses is intensified by various cognitive problems. Based on the experience of today's generation, evaluating the change as an unequivocal success would be unwarranted. Both approaches are justified: it would be wrong to blend the two and to weigh them by the same scale.

The authors critically discuss some of the theses of Svetozar Pejovich from his article On the Privatization of "Stolen Goods" in Central and Eastern Europe. The Independent Review, v. X, N. 2, Fall 2005, s. 209-229. ISSN 1086- 653. Their polemic can be summarized as follows: (1) According to Pejovich, the "carriers of the institutional restructuring" relied solely on the neo-classical ("text-book") economics. The authors reply that at least in their country also the New Institutional School, Austrian Economics and Public Choice were well known and broadly applied. (2) Pejovich seems to confuse privatization of an individual enterprise with the privatization of the society as a whole, i.e. the actual task of the governments. While the former may seek for an optimal owner, the latter is assigned "only" to launch the initial market for ownership rights. (3) Pejovich seems to believe that governments could have controlled the exact sequencing of their transformation steps and measures. By contrast, the authors stress the extreme spontaneity of the real-life developments and absurdity of the attempts to postpone, e.g., privatization - freeze it till some optimal legal frame emerges and-or is installed. (4) As to the Pejovich's de-communisation, the authors speculate that he may have generalized the Yugoslav experience, where the communists could have shared their Party's titoistic ideology. Contrariwise, the membership of a typical Czech communist was never based on the ideology and thus represented nothing about his/her post-communist concepts. (5) As to the Pejovich's own proposal "how to do it", the authors stress, again, its unrealistic nature, as what the proposal requires in fact is nothing less than to (a) accurately valuate thousands of state-owned enterprises, (b) rationally restructure them physically and financially, (c) offer and sell them at a correct price and (d) fairly divide the proceeds among its citizens. To the authors of this polemic, a task of this magnitude is beyond capacity of anybody, not to mention governments, least of all the post-communist ones.

After Czech voucher privatization many companies simply ignored the interests of their shareholders. The government has since increased the amount of regulation, but they have failed to establish significant investor confidence. This article offers some explanations of why their legal centric approach remains unlikely to create good corporate governance. Mandating that companies maximize shareholder value is easier said than done because it requires government to assess whether companies are making optimal business decisions. In former communist countries especially, government officials are ill suited to make such judgments because they lack the knowledge of how businesses should be properly run. Increased bureaucratic oversight in the Czech Republic has simply burdened markets without any noticeable positive results. This article discusses how good corporate governance can only be a byproduct of markets where managers compete for investors rather than something that can be created by law.