K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: GeneralNávrat zpět

The aim of this paper is to quantify the implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy in the Czech Republic between 1997 and 2013. Based on a unique dataset created for this study, the length and structure of implementation lag is analysed. Dataset is extending the original dataset used by the Czech National Bank. This study further analyses factors with an impact on implementation lag. Implementation lag is the length of period between decision of the economic policy makers on the actual response to the fundamental change in the economy and implementation of this response to the legislation. Average implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy in the Czech Republic is 2.4 quarters. The greatest deal counts for the implementation lag in the Chamber of Deputies. Length of implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy is influenced especially by the total occupancy of the Chamber of Deputies, majority, which the government parties have in the Parliament, and the frequency of the veto power usage.

The goal of this contribution is to evaluate the relevance of the institutional factors and the influence of the single variables on the corruption. The key task is to find not only suitable indicator of the amount of corruption but also suitable approximants of institutional characteristics, else economical characteristics. The important advantage of this article is its focus also on the corruption measured by alternative ways, compared to the often used CPI. From the institutional characteristic view for the corruption fight seems to be important stable legal background. Not less important is also the government stability and its accountability. In the contradiction with the expected hypotheses claiming the strong and resistant bureaucracy to be beneficial against the corruption fight, almost all executed analysis is based on the contra productivity of the bureaucracy independency on the corruption fight. It is also important to mention that the direct and indirect taxes vary with their influence on the corruption.

Economic analysis of law concerns predicting impacts of legislative rules on incentives and behaviour of individuals and judging social efficiency of alternative legislative rules. It applies price theory, welfare theory and public choice theory on creating and applying law. One of its main shortcomings however is the lack of criteria of social efficiency. Modern history of economic analysis of law begins within the framework of property rights and transaction costs theories. The Chicago school has been the most prominent group of economists. Austrian school and New institutional school compete with Chicago school in applying different methods of economic analysis on law. Chicago approach is based on assumptions of rational economic behaviour and stable preferences. In the centre of Chicago paradigm lies Richard Posner's efficiency thesis predicting that law rules develop in efficient ways. Austrian school criticizes Chicago school positivism from the perspectives of methodological subjectivism.

Author deals with essentials regarding economic analysis of law. The methodology of Law and Economics approach is in general summarized and the distinction between rational and behavioral concepts are mentioned. Additionally, the economics of contracts including subsumed contractual formation, obligation performance and potential dispute incidence, and agency by means of its economic advantages in sense of model applicable for a variety of particular legal relations are concerned.