H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: GeneralNávrat zpět

In accord with international transfer pricing regulations, the borrower's creditworthiness is the main factor to be reflected in valuation of cross-border loan transactions between associated enterprises. However, trouble invariably arises for small and medium-sized enterprises that do not have an assigned credit rating. The aim of this paper is to determine the most reliable predictors of a company's credit rating for European entities facing missing rating coverage for the purpose of transfer pricing. Based on 2015-2019 data sourced from the Orbis database, the study examines key financial ratios and non-financial information that could be instrumental in reconstructing a long-term rating category of a company assigned by Moody's Investors Service. The results identify interest coverage as the most useful predictor. Therefore, a law-approved and tax-acceptable approach to pricing of financial transactions between unrated parties (i.e., without credit rating) should preferably exploit interest coverage as a link to the otherwise missing ratings.

The essence of fiscal decentralization is to increase economic efficiency in the redistribution of resources in the public sector through more effective satisfaction of local public needs by lower levels of government. The article aims to quantify the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in relation to economic growth in a sample of 29 OECD countries for the years 1975-2018. Empirical research has shown a nonlinear relationship between the degree of fiscal decentralization and economic growth, which takes a parabolic shape. The optimal degree of fiscal decentralization maximizing economic growth reached the level of 31.3656%, or in the case of per capita growth, the level is 31.1309%. In most V4 countries, the degree of fiscal decentralization is at a lower level compared to the optimal one, which is not leading to maximization of economic growth, or economic growth per capita.

The objective of the paper is to study the political development in the Prague City Assembly after three elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014. The theory of voting games, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indexes, and theories of coalition formation are used for an analysis of possible majority coalitions. We developed the mayor's power index that measures the probability that the party will be the strongest party in the majority coalition with the right having a mayor. Measures of concentration of political power are used for evaluating the processes of political fragmentation. The increased number of political parties represented in the Prague City Assembly highly increased the number of possible coalitions and the number of political parties needed to form majority coalitions. The process of political fragmentation is probably not limited only to the Prague City Assembly.

The aim of this paper is to quantify the implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy in the Czech Republic between 1997 and 2013. Based on a unique dataset created for this study, the length and structure of implementation lag is analysed. Dataset is extending the original dataset used by the Czech National Bank. This study further analyses factors with an impact on implementation lag. Implementation lag is the length of period between decision of the economic policy makers on the actual response to the fundamental change in the economy and implementation of this response to the legislation. Average implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy in the Czech Republic is 2.4 quarters. The greatest deal counts for the implementation lag in the Chamber of Deputies. Length of implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy is influenced especially by the total occupancy of the Chamber of Deputies, majority, which the government parties have in the Parliament, and the frequency of the veto power usage.