D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism DesignNávrat zpět

The paper deals with the agent-principal problem (adverse selection) in the distribution of investment products. Utilising data from the Czech financial market, a linear model with mixed effects was constructed, evaluating the relationship between remuneration of individual agents and quality-costs of the products they recommend. The results were structured for different organisational setups. We have found that in some less important environments from the market perspective (small and medium multi-level marketing networks, small and big pools, medium and big flat firms), there is a negative association between quality-cost of the contracted product and the amount of commission paid out to the agent. This indicates potential consumer detriment. In the majority of organisations dominating the industry, however, the direction of this relationship is positive in nature or statistically insignificant. Hence, the systemic potential for instigating the adverse selection was not detected in a major part of the market, bringing up regulatory implications in the conflict of interest and inducements area.

The article contests an argument that the creation of a capital market in educational "human capital" and subsequent voluntary transactions on this market are sufficient to create equal opportunities in education, consequently reducing the income premium enjoyed by households with higher initial wealth endowment end eliminating deadweight detriments to efficiency caused by unequal household budget constraints. The counterargument is based on game-theoretical model developed in Bowles 2004. The inevitable incompleteness of contracts results in allocation inefficiency: agents with above average wealth endowment are able to finance larger projects, and/or projects of worse than average quality, while agents with insufficient initial wealth endowment are excluded from the financial market. This inefficiency can be attenuated only by redistribution enforced by the government. The article concludes with a discussion of the general relationship between equality (redistribution) and efficiency.

The authors of the article point out that the theory of economics has failed to yield a solid theoretical background in such critical situations as the period of the current fi nancial and economic crisis and the transformation period of post-communist economies. Mainly present crisis opens the question of unsatisfactory status of economic science. While classical liberal or Keynesian concepts are failing, theorists cannot look to mathematical modelling for help. It seems that traditional concepts are malfunctioning. Financial market is particularly predisposed for this process. The use of mathematical model is overvalued. The article calls attention on asymmetry of information problem and possible influence and adequacy of regulatory attitudes on return to equilibrium level, particularly in EU. The challenge for today's theoretical economists is to find a new concept for today's global era.

Learning is a subject of intense research in economics. We present persuasive evidence that learning took place among uninformed heterogeneous agents during a large-scale naturally-occurring set of auctions. Empirical study employs a unique bidding data set of 5000 individual investors that placed their bids in the voucher scheme that in terms of size, incentives, and variation is one of the largest experiments ever conducted. To detect and quantify learning we develop new measures of individual performance during the bidding process on the artificial stock market where prices of goods vary over successive stages of bidding on the basis of supply and demand.

This article is dealed about the requirements on new architecture of financial markets, namely for banking and insurance market. The principles of Basel II and Solvency II are discussed. The second part of article concerned with quality changes in comercial insurable risk and financial decesion of enormous natural catastrophes in last decade. The traditional way - insurance, reinsurance and public finance is completed by insurance derivates (CAT bondes) in present. This solution takes partial place by financing hurricanes Katrina and Rita claims.