D80 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: GeneralNávrat zpět

We shed light on the German-Russian relationship, focusing on the complexities that underlie their economic policy uncertainties over the period 1994–2023. We start with static unconditional correlation and dynamic conditional correlation analyses to examine the strength and temporal variations in the correlation between economic policy uncertainties of these two major countries. We then utilize standard and time-varying Granger causality analysis to uncover causal relationships. Importantly, we use a novel energy policy uncertainty index for Germany to explore interconnections between economic and energy policy uncertainties. We emphasize the importance of incorporating energy policy uncertainty in economic policy decision-making and international cooperation.

The literature on economic uncertainty has focused on the effects of uncertainty on the formal economy. Still, it has not addressed a relationship between uncertainty and shadow economy until now, to our knowledge. Therefore, this paper analyses the dynamic relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the shadow economy using panel vector autoregression estimates exploiting a dataset for 21 countries from 1997-2018. The impulse response analyses in this context reveal a mutual interaction of policy uncertainty and the shadow economy. In this respect, not only is the shadow economy found to respond to shocks in economic policy uncertainty, but also the uncertainty in economic policy appears to increase by a response to shocks in the shadow economy, implying a feedback effect from informal economic activities towards uncertainty. This effect is also thought to be responsible for aggravating negative influences of uncertainty on formal economic activities.

This study investigates whether the response of stock returns to economic policy uncertainty de- pends on the level of government size in the economy. Although there is a consensus in the liter- ature that stock markets react negatively to policy-related uncertainties, the factors that determine the magnitude of this effect have been ignored. This study is the first to demonstrate that the magnitude of this effect depends on the size of the government in the economy. In the study, data for the period 1997Q1-2021Q4 pertaining to 18 countries are used. According to results of fixed-effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors, economic policy uncer- tainty affects stock returns negatively. In addition, the coefficient of interaction term formed by the variables of policy uncertainty and government size is also negative and significant. These results indicate that the negative response of stock returns to policy uncertainty grows as gov- ernment size increases. The sensitivity analysis results show that the findings are not sensitive to the estimations made by alternative approaches and are therefore robust. The findings of the study contain important implications for policymakers. Investors can also benefit from the results at the point of international asset allocation against future policy-related uncertainties.

Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of moral hazard and that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral hazard also results from government interventionism. And in this case negative consequences are systematic and do result even in the absence of information asymmetries.

The core aim of this paper is to suggest comprehensive definition of the information economy and delineate the range of economic problems it deals with, paying particular attention to its connections to the economics of information. The text, in the extent provided, can not investigate thoroughly all the subjects associated with the information economy; it rather presents overview of the most important issues and illustrates them with examples from real and virtual markets. The major subjects concerned include: information asymmetries, revelation principle, network effects and externalities, economies of scale, standard wars, switching costs and lock-ins, multiple competitive equilibria, characteristics of online markets, impact of information technology on productivity, implications for governmental policies.

The St Petersburg paradox could be used as an extreme demonstration of the utility function cardinalisation in case of stochastic utility. In this article we reassume the von Neumann and Mongernstern explanation to this paradox based on the risk aversion expressed by the strict concavity of the expected utility function. We suggest the utility function derived from the Pareto distribution of the probability of downfall of the subject in danger. Our cardinal utility function is based on the economically reasonable economic assumption. In contrast to the other often used cardinal utility functions it does not need the specification of its parameters ad hoc. Other advantage of our utility function is its explanation of the difference in decision making of different "players" in the St Petersburg casino, based on their wealth (including the explanation of the situational risk seeking behaviour of players under the boundary of survival).

According to the effective market theory, the stock prize on an effective market is the best estimate of the stock's current value. This is the basic assumption for predictions using experimental markets. This article describes the first experimental market organised in the Czech Republic, the experimental political market for Czech parliamentary elections in June 2002. In the beginning we briefly describe the methodology of the predictions via electronic markets. Than we give some description of our market- number of traders, their individual results, development of the market activity in time, etc. Finally we compare the result of our election market with the traditional opinion polls. On the basis of his comparison we discuss the advantages and the limitations of the prediction using the experimental markets.