D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and MeasurementNávrat zpět

The author's main objective is to point out the existence of the paradox of involuntary improvement and to present a solution to this paradox. The paradox of involuntary improvement appears when a subject which suffers an injustice involuntarily still gets better off by this change. The suggested solution consists in the decomposition of the total effect of the pseudo-contract into the effect of the basic contract (which is desirable for the subject) and the effect of the super-contract (which is undesirable for the subject). Such a decomposition is not arbitrary, in the author's view, but necessary because it reflects the self-contradictory nature of the pseudo-contract, such as usury and sale/purchase at an unjust price. The author argues that the contract of usury and sale/purchase at an unjust price do not represent cases of Pareto improvement but rather cases of Kaldor-Hicks improvement (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939). The author's complementary objective is to show that the positive - normative dichotomy is an artificially created distinction which is supposed to cut off economics from its mother discipline, philosophy, and which moral sceptics used to deprive moral philosophy of the status of science.

This paper investigates the effects of economic growth on income inequality in EU countries by employing econometric models. We estimated the effect of growth on the share of income for all particular deciles of population and on the Gini. Other control variables were included in the models as well. The results showed a negative effect of economic growth on inequality, while this impact is the largest for the deciles ranging from the third to the seventh. This can be perceived as an indication of a shrinking middle class. Inequality-increasing effects were found for long-term unemployment, openness and partly for indicators of importance of the financial sector. Factors reducing inequality were rule of law and population with tertiary education. The size of government turned out to be a rather insignificant determinant.

A representative survey of adult population is used to analyse perceptions of existing income inequality and preferences for ideal income distribution in the Czech Republic. On average, Czechs view the distribution of disposable income as more unequal than it actually is. This biased perception results from underestimating total income shares belonging to bottom quintiles and overestimating the total income share belonging to the top income quintile. Whereas the majority of Czechs prefer some level of income stratification, there are about four tenths of people who would prefer to live in a completely equal society. These are primarily older, less educated and lower income people whose preferences formulated under uncertainty are mostly consistent with the maximin principle and inequality aversion. Almost a fifth of Czechs would prefer an income distribution consistent with efficiency concerns.

Unconditional basic income should guarantee that all residents have sufficient material conditions for their existence. Compared to other existing social security programs, basic income is unique in its simplicity. It also supports the individuals' freedom of use of their disposible time. The article analyzes the expected impact of the introduction of an unconditional basic income on the labor market. It also compares basic income to other social security programs (wage subsidies, targeted social programs, a negative income tax and tax credits) on a theoretical level from the perspective of a recipient. Unconditional basic income's effects on labor supply would be rather negative. However, relative to other social security programs, unconditional basic income can guarantee a higher or the same utility level, but it may not motivate to participate in the labor market. Additional positives are transparency and lack of incentives to cheat. The prospect of lower administrative costs depends on the specific basic income scheme in question.

Pareto efficiency plays the leading role throughout all branches of political economy. Frequently applied on various economic issues, Pareto efficiency decides on the optimal balance of resource distribution among economic agents. On the other hand, the current state of unequal distribution stimulates new economic researches to bring to light the relationship between market mechanism and observed inequality. The aim of the study is to provide a unique perspective on market-based inequalities which are derived from the self-preserving rationality of agents, and to prove that market mechanism inherently contains diverging forces. Additionally, it is showed that such divergences are not investigable by Pareto-optimization process; the process whose frequent misuse and misinterpretation obscures the general diverging drive of market mechanism and the process which may corrupt results of theoretical researches in the field.

A social rate of discount is an important variable for cost-benefit analysis. Its size can be crucial for an approval (or disapproval) of the project under evaluation, therefore it is important to have a theoretically founded estimate of the discount rate. There are two main approaches to estimating the social rate of discount. The first one is a so called social time preference rate (STPR), which is composed of three components: pure time preference, mortality rate and a component reflecting secular growth of per capita consumption and wealth. We agree with other authors that although pure time preference is not in reality zero for individuals due to myopia and irrationality, it should be equal to zero from the point of view of the public sector. We have also shown why it is inconsistent to use mortality rate directly as a component of the STPR and why a somewhat lower rate should be used instead. These two components together with an estimate of gradually decreasing growth of per capita consumption give a gradually decreasing STPR for the Czech Republic starting at 5.4 % and converging in 40 years' period to 2.8 % per year. The other approach to estimating the social discount rate is based on social opportunity costs (SOC). We used long-term bond yields for estimating a certainty equivalent social discount rate. We found gradually decreasing discount rate as appropriate, which starts at 3.2 % and declines by 0.016 percentage points per every year of duration of the project.

The authors' approach to the ethical and political aspects of inter-temporal interactions is the following: 1) Two representative agents Ra and Râ are analyzed and asymmetries in their wealth and voting powers are dealt with by a the text-book tool of a welfare function - its intra and inter-temporal application. 2) A generalized concept of a distance (measured in miles and years, respectively) is to indicate to what extend similarities and differences can be reasonably expected between Ra and Râ - their interests and values. With respect to a given distance, a discount factor then represents the weight that Ra ascribes to the well-being of his counter-party Râ. 3) In the intra-temporal case, the intuitive appeal of the concepts of solidarity, justice and discrimination is accepted, as well as the resultant transfers of wealth from the richer Ra" to his relatively poorer contemporary fellow Râ. 4) Contrariwise, the very concepts easily loose sense in the inter-temporal case. The arguments for this difference are that: (a) the same person may act as both Ra and Râ; the future Râ may be but a new sample of a given man, household, firm, nation … or even mankind itself, (b) wealth is likely to grow with the time-distance between the future Râ and the present decision maker Ra, (c) unlike the geographical distance, a time horizon is infinite; the future Râ may exist whenever - 10 days, 20 months or 17 000 years from now, (d) an interest rate or investment possibilities affect the present Ra's wealth or budget constraint. 5) With the level of aggregation of Ra and Râ, the analytical problems become still more eminent. Should then the two agents represent a mankind as a whole, it appears impossible to identify at what point of the future Râ lives - even if we managed to interpret the interests and preferences of us all today as Ra. A message is passed to natural scientists that they cross over to social analyses whenever they add valuations to their data - in a form of warnings not to mention regulatory proposals - and that as visitors they should respect the state of art of the contemporary social science, including its genuine advisory capacity, namely to globally established policy-makers. Hence, any regulatory constraint on our liberties and freedoms must be always viewed as an outcome of a political struggle - never then as a victory of a modern science, as the currently prevailing rhetoric may suggest.

The concept of utility is interpreted (in M. Friedman's intentions) as the present value of future income from investments in human capital occurring in the framework of personal consumption. In this sense consumption is regarded as a productive phenomenon. On this basis the concept of general economic equilibrium can be classified. On the one hand, instead of the disputable theory of social welfare the role of capital market in parallel creating equilibrium between supply and demand of investments opportunities, on the other hand, demand and supply of investment funds is applied. The proposed concept is applicable to explain current changes connected with the transition to knowledge based society.