D44 - AuctionsNávrat zpět

In the study, we focus on examining the impact of selected factors on the results of electronic reverse auctions and thus the savings achieved. The study extends the knowledge of extant literature to empirical insights and uses currently the broadest sample of approximately 16,000 e-auction cases. The study confirms that the savings calculation method and the use of a comparative or initial price affect the outcome of the auction as well as the individual selected factors entering the model (e-auction value, number of changes, number of extensions, number of bidders, number of items).

The article examines a mechanism of bid price determination in public procurement by individual tenderers. An auction model based on game theory, which maximizes expected profit of a firm bidding for public contract, is used to analyse this process. Firm within the model decides by comparing expected profit and transaction costs associated with submitting the bid whether to submit the bid or not. Furthermore, the article analyzes empirical data on public works contracts in the field of construction and reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants in the Czech Republic. The probability distribution of bid prices submitted by individual firms is mainly examined on these data. Based on the presented model and some finding from the data, a simulation of sequential biddings is executed consequently in which individual firms in their decision making use available data on submitted bids from the previous contracts.

This paper presents results of repeated economic lab experiments. They were designed to test a model of combinatorial auctions on the case of providing financial support (capital investment subsidies) to polluters. Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items. The advantage of combinatorial auctions is that the bidder can more fully express his preferences. This is particular important when items are complements. In the experiment presented in the paper, the polluters have two options: (i) to invest individually or (ii) create coalitions, i.e. to prepare and realize common capital investment projects. The common model of combinatorial auctions is described first in the paper. The design of the laboratory experiment is presented in the next section and the results are shown in the last section.

Learning is a subject of intense research in economics. We present persuasive evidence that learning took place among uninformed heterogeneous agents during a large-scale naturally-occurring set of auctions. Empirical study employs a unique bidding data set of 5000 individual investors that placed their bids in the voucher scheme that in terms of size, incentives, and variation is one of the largest experiments ever conducted. To detect and quantify learning we develop new measures of individual performance during the bidding process on the artificial stock market where prices of goods vary over successive stages of bidding on the basis of supply and demand.