D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and ImpactReturn

Poverty continues to be one of the major issues in Turkey, as in many other countries, with a large portion of the population - especially in rural areas - living below the poverty line. Those living in poverty have limited access to key public services such as education, healthcare and housing, which consequently exacerbates social and economic inequalities within society. The gap between wealthy and impoverished groups within society is continually expanding, primarily due to institutional factors that perpetuate this inequality. Drawing on data from 2009 to 2019, this study offers an empirical analysis of the role of institutions in shaping poverty in Turkey. The study applies the panel causality test developed by Juodis et al. (2021) to assess the influence of institutional structures on regional disparities. Infant mortality rates, the number of associate and bachelor's degree graduates and the number of convicts are considered key indicators of institutional performance. The statistical analysis reveals a significant correlation between these variables and the 50% poverty rate. The findings suggest that strengthening the institutional framework is essential for addressing regional poverty in Turkey.

Institutional economics is one of the most developing fields of economics. However, many its issues still need to be solved. For instance the theory does not give exact answer to why particular institutions (formal and informal norms) occur, change and cease to exist. The paper tries to solve the topic through the model of establishing and disrupting institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems. People live their whole lives in redistribution systems and they can be members of a winning coalition and receive some redistribution or they are out of coalition and the redistribution is made to their detriment. The members of a winning coalition are not, however, automatically guaranteed ongoing membership. So they have interest to establish a structure of institutions (institutional equilibrium) helping them to protect their position. The paper divides redistribution into two kinds: necessary and unnecessary redistribution. The process of creating a winning coalition in a redistribution system is described and it is shown how institutions help to facilitate the process. Then the paper defines the institutional equilibrium (IEQ) and its conditions. They are explained the connections between IEQ and redistribution systems, the conditions when is convenient for some players endeavour to create a equilibrium, the reasons why IEQ does not occur. The theory of institutional change is hereto used - if somebody endeavours to create a IEQ, (s)he also realizes a institutional change.

This paper inquires into beginnings of a gift economy as well as related contemporary institutions. Gift economy and the gift as a complex phenomenon was a common base for institutions of markets, credits, taxation, alms or social security. Inquires of origins, development and contemporary forms are consequently important contributions to our understanding to contemporary social institutions. We can also inquire with economists into present forms of a gift and look for reply to different questions about efficiency of a gift: Why to give, how to give and what way give a gift.

This paper starts with discussion about enhanced and frequently used conceptions of free markets, market failures and market primacy. There are pointed some simplifications due to the man should be prospective while using them, especially in applied economics. We have no positive definition of a free market and it is not clear, how often and if any we can observe such market about us. Troubles with market failures are derived from different meanings in different schools of economic thought. The market primacy is an abstract concept more than historical fact. Because of such difficulties the paper is inscribed to institutional alternative which is able to evolve complex research of institutions and to involve useful aspects of neoclassical economics. Useful ground for this analysis is institutional individualism which defines program for research of institutional framework of economy.

The paper is concerned with pension reform in the Czech Republic and abroad. It argues against two opinions: on the one hand, that it is not necessary to do anything, and on the other hand, that a mandatory funded system should be implemented. Both approaches are false, because of creating overwhelming explicit debts. The author recommends an evolutionary approach founded upon decreasing of PAYG in combination with voluntary savings.