D00 - Microeconomics: GeneralReturn

The impact of different financing alternatives on two simple models of the university system is analysed in this paper. Both models are agent - based, the reason is that we analyse a system of heterogeneous universities instead of a representative university. Models differ in the rules for the decision-making of universities. In the first - optimising model - each university in each period maximalizes the probability of survival, control variables are the income of universities and the salary of teachers. In the second model we implicitly assume constrained rationality or shortage of relevant information and each university in each period reacts according to simple rules on the difference between the number of applicants and its capacity. Basic result is that the behaviour of models in different situations differs with the financing alternatives and it would be an oversimplification to generalize that some of the financing alternative is always the best.

The text considers one of the prevailing dilemmas for the time being practical valuers of assets are exposed to - the operability of market value in terms of International Valuation Standards. The issue is considered theoretically, practical impacts are outlined as well. Considering the microeconomic basis of market structure and price determination, the prerequisites for an "objective" market value are summed. The International Valuation Standards are explained as an evolutionary evolved institution, which suffers under deep impact of neoclassical methodology. At the end there are drawn some conclusions for the regulation of valuation in the Czech Republic.

This paper deals with a broad and controversial part of microeconomic theory represented by the theory of the firm. An overview of the main line of criticism of the orthodox (classical) theory of the firm and also of the theories proposed as reactions to one or more aspects of this criticism is given. However, the attention is attached to managerial theories of the firm, which are represented especially by the models of Baumol, Williamson and Marris. In each case the assumptions of the particular theory are stated, followed by graphical and mathematical exposition of its main conclusions. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the contributions and setbacks of managerial theories.

Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of moral hazard and that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral hazard also results from government interventionism. And in this case negative consequences are systematic and do result even in the absence of information asymmetries.