C92 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group BehaviorReturn

The issue of tax compliance represents one of the topics where laboratory experiments may provide important insights into human economic decision making. The empirical evidence on the topic is limited as the decision on tax evasion is purely private information of the taxpayer. The experiment presented in the paper focuses on two main topics. At first, we analyze potential influence of two factors - probability of being caught while cheating on taxes and penalty rate imposed on subject who evade. We conclude that behavior of the Czech subjects corresponds to foreign results. At the same time, there is a stronger effect when probability of being caught increases. The effect of increasing penalty rate is rather moderate. Second research question focuses on the terminology used during the experiment. We find that the rate of tax compliance is higher within experimental sessions where subjects face neutral language in the instructions compared to the group with loaded instruction (tax language). This behavior contradicts the results to date and indicates possible country effect which could be linked to specifics of posttransformational society.

Economic education is considered of prime importance nowadays with direct implications for effectiveness of monetary policy. We aim to verify with an application of experimental method, whether economic education acquired has weakening or even suppressive effects on recently resurrected phenomenon of money illusion. If our hypothesis will be proved, previous evidence about signifi cant indirect effects of money illusion, causing significant long-lasting deviations of the economy from equilibrium after the shock, might be significantly alleviated, weakening thereby predictions of the New Keynesian model. Our findings suggest that even well-educated individuals do not have the ability to pierce the veil of money and do not form expectations properly after a fully anticipated monetary shock. As a result we can infer that money illusion is multiplied and nominal rigidities are intensifi ed even in the economy that consists of well-educated individuals.

This paper presents results of repeated economic lab experiments. They were designed to test a model of combinatorial auctions on the case of providing financial support (capital investment subsidies) to polluters. Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items. The advantage of combinatorial auctions is that the bidder can more fully express his preferences. This is particular important when items are complements. In the experiment presented in the paper, the polluters have two options: (i) to invest individually or (ii) create coalitions, i.e. to prepare and realize common capital investment projects. The common model of combinatorial auctions is described first in the paper. The design of the laboratory experiment is presented in the next section and the results are shown in the last section.