Politická ekonomie 2020, 68(5):515-533 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1294

Známý versus neznámý vlastník: vazby mezi transparentním vlastnictvím a firemním rozhodováním

Jan Hanousek, Jr.a, Jan Hanousekb
a Muma College of Business, University of South Florida, Tampa, USA
b CERGE-EI, společné pracoviště UK v Praze a NHÚ AV ČR, v. v. i., a CEPR, Londýn

Known Versus Anonymous Ownership: Exploring Links Between Ownership Transparency and Firms’ Decisions

The paper extends existing research on the effects of ownership structures on company performance by including a dimension of transparency in the ownership structure. We analyse the effect of an unknown owner and pyramidal structure on company profitability, capital structure and investment. We conduct this research in accordance with existing theories on a panel of private companies within the cultural and political alliance of four Central European countries, called the Visegrad Group. The total population includes over 111,000 firm-level panel data observations between 2001 and 2015. Lack of transparency in the ownership structure leads to lower investment and profitability, both for the case of an anonymous owner and for companies in a corporate pyramid. The capital structure of the company is not influenced by the presence of an anonymous owner; however, the existence of the ownership pyramid leads, ceteris paribus, to a larger debt for the firm.

Keywords: anonymous ownership, capital structure, investment, profit, ownership, private firms, Visegrad countries, signalling
JEL classification: F23, G32, G35

Received: January 31, 2020; Revised: June 18, 2020; Accepted: June 18, 2020; Published: October 27, 2020  Show citation

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Hanousek, J., & Hanousek, J. (2020). Known Versus Anonymous Ownership: Exploring Links Between Ownership Transparency and Firms’ Decisions. Politická ekonomie, 68(5), 515-533. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.1294
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