Politická ekonomie 2000, 48(3) | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.145

Řízení a správa společností a zbytkové státní vlastnictví (dva kvalitativní nedostatky privatizace v tranzitivních zemích)

Wladimir Andreff

Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)

The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition.

Keywords: privatization, transition countries, state regulation, criminal or non legal activities, corporate governance

Published: June 1, 2000  Show citation

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Andreff, W. (2000). Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries). Politická ekonomie48(3), . doi: 10.18267/j.polek.145
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